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31. Introduction 
This paper examines the household labor supply choices of foreign-born and US-native 
couples, to explore the role of spousal ethnic background on the extent to which bargaining 
power forces matter in household decisions, using data from the 2000 US Census.  
The phenomena of immigrants‟ labor market outcomes and the influence of their cultural 
background  on  one  side,  and  intra-household  bargaining  power  and  household  decision-
making on the other, have been widely studied in the literature. A large body of theoretical 
and  empirical  literature  shows  that  the  intra-household  distribution  of  power  influences 
households‟  outcomes  in  both  developing  and  developed  countries  (Chiappori,  Fortin, 
Lacroix,  2002;  Grossbard-Shechtman,  1993;  Grossbard  and  Amuedo-Dorantes,  2007; 
Lundberg  and  Pollak,  1996;  Schultz,  1990;  Thomas,  1990).  In  particular,  the  collective 
household behavior model predicts that household members make Pareto-efficient decisions 
according to their respective bargaining power positions, which in turn depend on outside 
opportunities  and  social  and  legal  factors,  such  as  members‟ relative  share  of  non-labor 
income,  their  age  differences,  and  abortion  and  divorce  laws  (Browning,  Bourguignon, 
Chiappori, Lechene, 1994; Chiappori et al., 2002; Oreffice, 2007).  
There  is  empirical  evidence  of  these  bargaining  power  effects  concerning  various 
countries,  from  different  cultures  and  parts  of  the  world  (Grossbard-Shechtman,  2003; 
Rangel, 2006; Reggio, 2011; Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990). While each of these empirical 
studies has focused on one country, no emphasis has been devoted to differences across 
ethnicities  within  a  country.  A  notable  exception  is  represented  by  Gupta  and  Stratton‟s 
(2010) two-country analysis (US and Denmark). These authors argue that different social 
norms across countries can affect intra-household bargaining power, mitigating or reinforcing 
the  bargaining  effect  on  couples‟  decisions  concerning  leisure  and  labor  supply.  Still,  a 
general comparison of the role of bargaining power forces in household decisions across 
different cultural and ethnic backgrounds is called for.  
A  recent  strand  of  literature  specifically  emphasizes  the  role  of  culture  and  family 
experience  on  economic  outcomes  such  as  female  labor  force  participation  and  fertility 
choices, and on the marriage market. Blau, Kahn, and Papps (2011), Fernandez and Fogli 
(2006, 2009), and Fernandez (2007) show that culture, as measured by female labor force 
participation rate and total fertility in country of origin, explains fertility and labor market 
choices of American women living in the US but born from foreign parents, while male labor 
supply is not affected by the country of origin. Using the same US Census data and the same 
sources of variation for cultural differences such as country of origin, length of stay in the 
US, and linguistic distance, related literature studies the determinants of interethnic marriages 
and  living  arrangements  (e.g.,  Angrist,  2002;  Chiswick,  Houseworth,  2010;  Furtado  and 
Theodoropoulos,  2011;  Giuliano,  2007).  In  particular,  Giuliano  (2007)  emphasizes  the 
importance of analyzing the role of culture in a “neutral environment”, using samples drawn 
from the population of only one country. Finally, culture and especially immigration has also 
4been linked to labor market activity and the extent of wage and employment consequences 
for native and foreign-born workers (e.g., Borjas, 1999; Adserà and Chiswick, 2007), but the 
present work is only indirectly linked to this latter field.  
All these studies highlight that the main challenge in this line of research is to disentangle 
culture  from  institutional  and  traditional  economic  variables  such  as  prices  and  income. 
Indeed,  this  paper  addresses  this  feature  using  a  common  large  data  set  such  as  the  US 
Census, with native and foreign-born individuals from a large variety of countries at different 
stages of development and judgment of gender roles in society, who live and work in the US, 
facing the same institutions and also the same bargaining power measures.  
Neither the literature on household decision-making and balance of power nor the studies 
on culture and labor supply or interethnic marriages account for the intra-household aspects 
of spouses‟ ethnicity. Actually, they do not consider an additional and potentially relevant 
mechanism through which culture affects couples‟ labor supplies and household decisions in 
general,  which  is  their  responsiveness  to  bargaining  power  forces  and  how  culture  can 
mitigate or reinforce gender empowerment through this channel. 
This cultural mechanism through which intra-household bargaining power and couples‟ 
labor supplies may be related, is analyzed here using the five-percent national random sample 
of the 2000 US Census data on husbands and wives. Specifically, I investigate the extent to 
which spouses from different ethnicities respond heterogeneously to bargaining power forces 
in  the  US,  as  measured  by  the  gaps  in  spouses‟  ages,  and  non-labor  income,  within  a 
collective  household  labor  supply  framework.  The  recent  immigration  waves  throughout 
Europe and the US, along with the sizable presence in the US of immigrants from a variety of 
ethnical  backgrounds  prompt  to  explore  whether  household  decision-making  depends  on 
spouses‟ ethnicity and their gender roles models of reference.  
The US Census data provide the most recent largest sample of households with foreign-
born spouses, their detailed ethnic, demographic, labor and income information, along with 
standard samples of US-native individuals. The degree of cultural differences from the US 
mainstream is captured through the information on the country of birth of each spouse, and 
the country mainstream beliefs on women‟s family and labor market roles. Following the 
definition of culture offered by Fernandez (2007), I consider culture as a set of beliefs and 
preferences, which are important determinants of behavior. The cultural proxies of both the 
husband and the wife are analyzed, as the husbands‟ culture may be important in driving 
work decisions and household responsiveness to bargaining power forces (Fernandez and 
Fogli, 2009). 
I focus on recent (first generation) immigrants, who are less likely to have assimilated and 
mitigated their culture and beliefs to the US mainstream, to better capture the corresponding 
disparities in the bargaining power effects at stake. Individuals in my sample face the same 
markets and institutions by construction, so that only the belief and preference components 
(the  cultural  components)  are  potentially  relevant.  The  main  assumption  here  is  that 
5immigrants bring with them some of the attitudes of their country of origin (Carroll, Rhee, 
and Rhee, 1994). Then, since they differ by their own cultural heritage, it is still possible to 
estimate the impact of cultural differences on a common set of variables, as such eliminating 
unobserved heterogeneity and comparability concerns which would result from cross-country 
estimation from separate data sets.  
I am not aware of any previous study exploring the role of cultural background when 
analyzing the influence of intra-household bargaining power on labor supplies of couples 
living  in  the  same  country.  In  particular,  the  importance  of  this  novel  approach  rests  in 
providing an empirical assessment and cross-culture comparisons which may be useful to 
devise public policies targeting immigrant households and their women in particular. These 
households may be the ones least likely to respond and take advantage of an “empowerment” 
policy,  because  of  their  cultural  background  “constraining”  them  to  ignore  outside 
opportunities and welfare enhancement measures.  
The focus here is on the differences in age and non-labor income ownership between 
spouses as indicators of intra-household bargaining power. The distributions of these traits 
within a couple, which capture each spouse‟s outside opportunities, are commonly estimated 
to have a significant impact on household choices such as labor supply, clothing expenditure 
and  children‟s  health  (Browning  et  al.,  1994;  Browning,  Chiappori,  and  Weiss,  2011; 
Grossbard-Shechtman,  1993;  Grossbard  and  Amuedo-Dorantes,  2007;  Schultz,  1990; 
Thomas, 1990), consistently with them representing bargaining power forces. When a spouse 
has  a  relatively better trait (relatively richer or  older), the distribution of gains  from the 
relationship would shift in his/her favor, generating opposite income effects on the spouses. 
Consequently, the spouse with a more favorable bargaining position would decrease his/her 
labor supply, while his/her mate would increase his/hers (Browning et al., 1994; Chiappori et 
al., 2002). 
My identification strategy consists of estimating the associations of intra-household age 
and non-labor income gaps with both spouses‟ labor supplies, comparing differences in their 
labor  supplies  cross-sectionally  among  US-born,  and  foreign-born  couples  with  various 
extents of cultural disparities. I test whether these bargaining power forces have stronger 
labor supply responses on married individuals with an ethnic background supporting more 
egalitarian gender roles. This study thus considers individuals who are already married to 
men and women of their same cultural background, leaving aside the interesting patterns of 
intermarriage  or  sorting  by  ethnicity,  which  have  recently  been  empirically  analyzed  in 
Furtado and Theodoroupoulos (2011). 
The  empirical  analysis  shows  that  the  labor  supplies  of  US-born  spouses  are  more 
responsive to the differences between spouses in age and non-labor income, than the labor 
supplies  of  couples  where  spouses  belong  to  ethnicities  supporting  a  traditional  role  of 
women. In US-born couples, and in those coming from countries with family institutions 
6similar to the US
1
This evidence reveals that US-born married men work fewer annual hours the older, 
and/or the richer, they are relatively to their wives. A 5-year difference implies working about 
12 hours less, and a 5,000 dollars more of non-labor income relative to their wives implies 
about 9 hours less. For wives, the corresponding figures are 8 and 50 hours more. While the 
foreign-born with cultural differences from the US do not exhibit any significant impact of 
these differences, those immigrant households with cultural background very similar to the 
US show a significant association with these bargaining power measures: for husbands, 25 
and 12 hours less, and for their wives 26 and 50 hours more. The estimated correlation of 
labor supply and age difference is higher in magnitude than in the case of US-born couples. 
These estimates suggest that spousal traits and empowerment are assessed differently across 
couples within the US, according to their culture of origin. 
, a relatively older, or richer spouse supplies less labor, the opposite holding 
for his/her mate, controlling for both spouses’ demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics. This first piece of evidence on both spouses’ labor supplies, and the signs of 
the estimated coefficients is consistent with the household bargaining power interpretation. 
Interestingly, households whose culture of origin is quite different and more “traditional” 
than the US do not exhibit any relationship between this measured balance of power and their 
labor supply decisions.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework. Section 
3 describes the empirical specification and the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results 
and robustness checks, while Section 5 considers alternative explanations. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
The collective household labor supply model with distribution factors(Chiappori et al., 
2002)  is applied to US-born and foreign-born couples with different degrees of cultural 
disparities with respect to the US, and thus with a potentially different responsiveness to 
bargaining power forces. A household is composed of two decision makers, husband and 
wife, each having a distinct utility function on consumption and leisure, and making Pareto-
efficient decisions. Preferences are egoistic, in that one mate’s utility does not depend on the 
other’s consumption or leisure, although  the model can be extended to allow for caring 
preferences and public goods. Let h
i  and C
i  for i = h, w denote member i’s labor supply and 
consumption of a private composite good (whose price is normalized to unity), y  the 
household non-labor income, wi  the wage rate of spouse  i,  and  i z   possible preference 
parameters and ethnic background of each spouse, such as education, race, country of birth, 
intensity of cultural beliefs.  Finally, let s1  and s2  represent the two distribution factors 
                                                 
1 The similarity of institutions is defined according to the country of origin, and categorized in the three groups “very 
similar”, “somewhat similar”, and “different” from the US culture, as detailed in Section 3.1.  
7(bargaining power forces) under analysis: the differences between spouses in non-labor 
income and age. The utility function of member i = h, w is  ) , 1 (
i i i C h U − , where U is strictly 
quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable, while, following convention, the 
utility from companionship is assumed to be additive and not to influence the trade-off 
between leisure and consumption.  
The optimal allocations of labor supply of each spouse are determined by the following 
program:  
) , 1 ( max
,
h h h
C h C h U h h −  
subject to 
h
h w h w h
h h w z z s s y w w C + ≤ ) , , , , , , ( 2 1 ϕ  
where the spouse faces a symmetric problem.  ) , , , , , , ( 2 1 w h w h z z s s y w w ϕ   represents  the 
husband’s share of non-labor income y, while the wife receives y - ) , , , , , , ( 2 1 w h w h z z s s y w w ϕ , 
so that the stronger the husband’s bargaining power, the higher his share of non-labor income 
and the lower his wife’s. The sharing rule  ) , , , , , , ( 2 1 w h w h z z s s y w w ϕ  is a function of prices 
(here normalized to unity), spouses’ wages, household non-labor income, distribution factors 
(here the non-labor income gap and age gap)
2
The couple’s Pareto-efficient decisions yield the following equilibrium labor supply 
functions of the two spouses:  
, and other observable characteristics z 
(preference and ethnicity parameters).  
)] , , , , , , ( , [ 2 1 w h w h h
h h z z s s y w w w h h ϕ =               
)] , , , , , , ( , [ 2 1 w h w h w
w w z z s s y w w y w h h ϕ − =              
The derivatives of each labor supply function with respect to the second arguments are 
expected to be negative, reflecting a pure income effect (leisure is commonly assumed to be a 
normal good). Hence, factors that strengthen the husband’s bargaining power reduce the labor 
supplied by the husband and increase the labor supplied by the wife, ceteris paribus, in 
particular controlling for own wage and the couples’ total non-labor income y. I empirically 
investigate whether foreign-born couples’ hours of work are related to such factors in the 
direction predicted by the theory and already estimated for US-born couples in general, by 
testing their relationship on the labor supplies of foreign-born couples from different cultural 
backgrounds, and comparing it to the corresponding one of US-born spouses. 
                                                 
2 The sex ratio, divorce laws, abortion legalization, alimony, and child benefits laws, are other examples of distribution 
factors that have been studied in the literature on heterosexual households (Chiappori et al, 2002; Lundberg and Pollak, 
1996; Oreffice, 2007). 
 
8The  decisions  of  spouses  whose  country  of  origin  supports  strict  gender  roles  and 
traditional family institutions relative to the US, may be very weakly related to bargaining 
power  forces.  Their  household  behavior  may  reflect  a  setting  where  spousal  personal 
characteristics and outside opportunities do not influence their household decision-making. 
The  non-labor  income  difference  and  age  differences  represent  relevant  monetary  and 
demographic personal traits also enhancing spouses‟ outside opportunities, which have been 
extensively estimated to be sources of bargaining power (e.g., Browning et al., 2011). If they 
did not significantly enter an immigrant couple‟s decision process, this would suggest that its 
cultural background inhibits this mechanism and any actual intra-household bargaining, so 
that the labor supplies of this type of couples would not depend on these factors. 
The  following  empirical  analysis  specifically  tests  the  predictions  of  Chiappori  et  al. 
(2002) which were developed for married working couples. Within this framework, this study 
as  well  mainly  focuses  on  marriages  where  both  individuals  are  working,  subsequently 
extending  the  estimation  to  include  individuals  who  do  not  work,  through  a  Heckman‟s 
sample selection model. 
 
3. Empirical Specification and Data Description 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
The main sample under analysis consists of married couples with both spouses between 18 
and 65 years of age. I identify US-born and foreign-born spouses using information on the 
person‟s place of birth, further categorizing foreign-born couples according to their specific 
country of origin and to whether husband and wife share the same cultural background
3. The 
focus is on first generation immigrants, as a differential impact of bargaining power forces 
should be more pronounced for those who actually were born and spent some time in a 
country different from the US. Recent immigrants are less likely to have assimilated and 
mitigated their culture and beliefs to the US mainstream (Antecol, 2000). Individuals in the 
sample face the same markets and institutions, however, since they may differ by their own 
and/or their spouses‟ cultural heritage, it is still possible to estimate the impact of cultural 
differences on a common set of variables, as such eliminating unobserved heterogeneity and 
comparability concerns which would result from cross-country estimation from separate data 
sets (Fortin, 2005).  
Spouses are defined to share the same cultural background if they are from the same 
country of origin, or from different countries of origin provided that these are characterized 
by similar prevailing beliefs in terms of gender roles, family institutions, and religion. To 
establish these comparisons, I follow a similar procedure to Carroll et al. (1994) and Antecol 
(2000), who identify sets of countries where the prevailing beliefs are comparable to the US 
                                                 
3 Country of birth is considered a more robust measure than ancestry (e.g., Chiswick and Houseworth, 2011). 
9ones, and others where they are different, assuming that there are cultural similarities among 
the countries of each of these groups. More refined groups of countries are used here than in 
Carroll et al. (1994). Specifically, I construct dummy variables for each of the following set 
of countries, according to views of gender roles in the family and society overall: countries 
with culture very different from the US, i.e., all Central and South American countries, all 
Asian  countries  but  China,  all  African  and  Middle-Eastern  countries;  countries  with  a 
somewhat  similar  culture  to  the  US.,  i.e.,  Spain,  Greece,  Italy,  Malta,  Portugal,  Cypro, 
Bulgaria, Check Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Baltic Republics, China; 
countries with a very similar culture to the US, i.e., Canada, Scandinavian countries, UK, 
Austria,  Germany,  Belgium,  France,  Liechtenstein,  Luxemburg,  Monaco,  Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Australia, New Zeland. This “full dummy controls” approach does not impose 
any restrictions on the influence of the country of birth, whereas specifications with female 
labor force participation or total fertility rates would, so that the former method is preferred 
here (e.g., Antecol, 2000 for a discussion of this advantage). 
Moreover, excluded from the sample are all individuals in school, in the military, in farm 
households,  or  not  working.  A  couple  consists  of  the  head  of  the  household and  his/her 
spouse, sorted into husbands and wives, controlling for the gender of the household head 
through a dummy variable
4. Only couples where both the head and the spouse are actually 
present are considered, while I exclude households where there are multiple spouses, or more 
than two adults.  
The  following  labor  supply  equations  are  estimated  for  husbands  and  wives,  and  run 
separately on each type of couples, US-born, foreign-born, and foreign-born divided into the 
three above categories reflecting different degrees of cultural similarity to the US: 
h w h h X diff age diff y y w w h               _ _ ln ln 2 1 3 2 1  
w w h w X diff age diff y y w w h               _ _ ln ln 2 1 3 2 1  
where the dependent variable is total annual hours worked in the previous year, and y_diff 
and age_diff are the two bargaining power factors under consideration
5. The former is defined 
as the husband‟s total non-labor income in dollars minus the wife‟s total non-labor income in 
dollars, while the latter as the husband‟s age in years minus the wife‟s age in years. Both the 
individual non-labor income and age variables do not have any missing values and their 
differences can be either positive or negative, or zero
6. In the Census, the age and all the 
                                                 
4  The  Census  defines  the  head  as  the  individual  who  owns  the  housing  unit  or  signs  the  rental  contract,  and  the 
partner/spouse is the individual who identifies himself/herself as such. 
5 The difference (ratio) in educational attainment across partners was also explored, but it did not exhibit any impact on 
household labor supplies, as in Browning et al. (1994). 
6 The ratio of non-labor incomes and the ratio of ages were used as alternative distribution factors. However, the former is 
not defined for the several couples with no non-labor income, and they both introduce non-linearities in the labor supply 
equations.  
10income questions are asked to each adult in the household, so that their measures are self-
reported, rather than reported by a proxy respondent.      
The identification strategy of these bargaining power factors consists of estimating 1  and
2  for husbands, and 1  and 2  for wives and comparing these estimates across couples with 
different  cultural  backgrounds.  The role  of  the non-labor  income  difference  on  the  labor 
supply  of  husbands  and  wives  is  captured  by 1  and 1  .  According  to  the  collective  labor 
supply framework, if a spouse is relatively richer, then his/her labor supply should be lower 
and the labor supply of his/her mate should be higher than in other households without this 
income  disparity.  Hence,  1  should  be  negative,  while 1  should  be  positive.  The 
corresponding  coefficients  for  age  difference  are 2  and 2  .  If  being  relatively  older  is  a 
favorable  trait  associated  to  higher  intra-household  bargaining  power,  so  that  the  older 
spouse‟s labor supply should be lower and the labor supply of his/her mate should be higher 
than in the absence of this age gap, then  2  should be negative and 2  positive.  
The other regressors are the logarithm of the hourly wage rate 
i w of each spouse i = h, w, 
the couple‟s total non-labor income y
7, and a vector of covariates X. X includes education of 
each  spouse  (number  of  completed  years  of  schooling),  number  of  each  spouse‟s  own 
children living in the household, citizenship status, and only own age of spouse i, so that the 
effect of age_diff can be identified. Dummy variables for racial profiles are also included at 
the  individual  level.  Taking  into  account  education  can  eliminate  the  indirect  effect  that 
culture  may  have  on  spouses‟  labor  supply  choices,  as  those  individuals‟  (especially 
women‟s) who work in the labor market due to their cultural background, are also more likely 
to be more highly educated. This aspect should not interfere with the effect of the bargaining 
power variables.  
The vector X also includes state fixed effects, which should capture the different labor 
market opportunities and social and legal attitudes toward immigrants and interethnic couples 
that exist across states.
8  Robust standard errors clustered by state are used to allow for 
correlation of household observations within state. I alternatively clustered by metropolitan 
area (or microdata area „puma‟ or „conspuma‟)
9. My specifications do not use a differences-
in-differences estimator: husbands‟ and wives‟ regressions are estimated separately, across 
types  of  couples.  As  such,  they  should  not  suffer  from  the  understated  standard  errors 
                                                 
7 All wage and income variables refer to the previous year 1999. I consider individuals who are not self-employed, so that 
earned income coincides with wage income, and non-labor income indeed represents non-earned income sources. Results are 
robust to the inclusion of the self-employed (less than 10 percent of my samples).   
8 Alternatively, I include the state unemployment rate, the state total labor force participation and female labor force 
participation, to control for the level of economic activity in a state, and especially for employment opportunities. 
9 The Census reports that many metropolitan areas have only been partially identified in 2000, and that “users should not 
assume that the identified portion of a partly-identified metropolitan area is a representative sample of the entire 
metropolitan area”. Therefore the main specifications above are clustered by state. 
11highlighted by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). At any rate, clustering by state 
(metropolitan area) should rectify such an underestimation, if it is present. 
The focus here is on working individuals. However, results are robust to the inclusion of 
non-working spouses in the estimation of each spouse‟s labor supply equation, accounting for 
a potential selection bias toward working individuals, by correcting for sample selection with 
Heckman‟s  sample  selection  model,  estimated  by  means  of  maximum  likelihood.  The 
selection equation for the head is given by: 
h h h u X ch young diff age diff y y P           _ _ _ 3 2 1   
where the dependent variable is whether the individual participates in the labor market, 
and young children young_ch
h (defined as “the number of own children age 4 and under”), 
affects only the participation decision, i.e., it is the exclusion restriction. 
 The outcome equation for the head is given by 
h p h h X diff age diff y y w w h               _ _ ln ln 2 1 3 2 1  
where the dependent variable is total annual hours worked in the previous year and the 
other covariates were described above
10. These equations are similarly defined for the spouse. 
As it is well-known, the assumption about normality on the distribution of 
h u and 
h  can be 
used as a source of identification, since the inverse mills ratio is a non-linear function of the 
variables in the selection equation. However, I am also including young children as exclusion 
restriction. Both procedures yield similar robust results.  
 
3.2 Data Description 
Estimation is carried out on the US Census data for the year 2000, specifically its five-
percent sample “5% IPUMS data” (1-in-20 national random sample of the population), which 
provides  the  most  recent  largest  sample  of  households  with  foreign-born  spouses,  their 
detailed ethnic, demographic, labor and income information, along with standard samples of 
US-born individuals. These data allow to identify the country of birth of household members, 
along with the number of years already spent living in the US (both in terms of time since 
first  entered  in  the  US,  and  years  lived  in  the  US).  These  latter  variables  capture  the 
accumulation of US-specific human capital, and may also proxy for marital duration, and will 
                                                 
10  Predicted  wages  are  used  to  measure  the  non-working  spouses‟ wages  and  to  address  the  possible  endogeneity  of 
individuals‟ observed wages. To predict individuals‟ wages, a standard human capital approach is implemented, as it has 
been in the collective labor-supply literature (e.g., Donni, 2007), through a wage equation in which wage depends on the 
individual‟s age,  race,  education,  education  squared,  and  education  cubed,  but  does  not  depend  on  his/her  spouse‟s 
characteristics. This equation is then estimated separately for husbands and wives, with a correction for selection bias. This 
participation decision depends on the number of children, dummies for age brackets, education, race and measures of local 
economy.  The  fitted  values  thus generated  then  replace the  wage  observations of  the  corresponding  individuals in  the 
samples (Tables report estimation with the predicted spouse‟s and own wages). 
12be used as additional controls. Many cross-country differences in the economic environment 
are  difficult  to  capture  with  aggregate  statistics,  so  that  cross-country  analyses  may  fail 
because of mis-measuring or omitting important variables. The advantage of the approach at 
stake to use US Census household level data from a single country is that all the immigrants 
face the same economic environment and institutions. Also, within-country studies provide 
better controls for human capital and labor factors, such as education (Antecol, 2000).  
Specifically,  a  random  sample  (50  percent)  of  married  “heads”  and  “spouses”  were 
extracted from the Census using the variables “relationship to household head” and “marital 
status‟. Records in these files were then matched on the household identification code “serial” 
to create a single observation for each couple. Using the variable “sex”, couples with the head 
being  the  husband  were  then  identified  with  a  dummy  variable  index.  Individuals  with 
imputed values for sex, marital status, relationship to household head and country of origin 
were excluded from the main samples (about 1% of observations are dropped). This method 
prevents couples from being misclassified, in particular in terms of cultural backgrounds.  
Individual weights are used to make the sample representative of the US population and 
economy. The state unemployment rate, state total labor force participation and female labor 
force participation are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Couples of US-born 
spouses are restricted to non-Hispanic whites, to hold a uniform reference group representing 
US culture. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the husbands‟ and wives‟ main variables, by 
type of couple. On average, wives are younger, less educated, earn a lower wage and work 
fewer hours than their spouses, regardless of their US or foreign-born status. In the US-born 
samples, spouses are more similar in terms of age, education and hours worked. The more 
dissimilar to US culture, the less educated couples are. On average, the age difference is 
about 1.98 for US-born and 2.83 years for foreign-born ones overall, while the non-labor 
income difference is around $ 2,002 and $ 1,285, respectively. Both of these differences 
exhibit a sizable variation in all these samples, the standard deviations being several times 
larger than their means. 
132.18 4.53 2.18 4.53 1.98 4.23 1.98 4.23 2.82 4.14 2.82 4.14
3543 18115 3543 18115 2002 13851 2002 13851 1285 11362 1285 11362
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
All Couples American Couples Foreign Couples
              Husbands                 Wives               Husbands                 Wives               Husbands                 Wives







Couple's non-labor income Y
Number of children
Number of observations
Foreign Couples Foreign Couples Foreign Couples
with different culture from US with somewhat similar culture to US    with very similar culture to US
              Heads                 Partners               Heads                 Partners               Husbands Wives







Couple's non-labor income Y
Number of children
Number of observations
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as husband's age (total non-labor income) minus wife's age (total non-labor income).
*For women and men with positive hours of work.  
144. Results 
4.1 Main Evidence 
Table 2 presents the results of several regressions where the dependent variable is the 
husbands‟ or the wives‟ annual hours of work (our measure of labor supply), separately for 
couples of different cultural backgrounds.  
Columns 1-4 and 11-12 show a negative significant relationship of the age and income 
differences on the hours worked by married men, whereas for married women the coefficients 
are  positive  significant,  controlling  for  both  spouses‟  demographic  and  socioeconomic 
characteristics. The older or richer husbands are, the lower their labor supply and the higher 
the labor supply of their wives, in the overall sample, in US-born couples or in foreign-born 
couples whose cultural background is very similar to the US. The older (richer) spouse may 
hold a more favorable bargaining position and works less, while his/her mate works more. 
Specifically, in US-born couples, a 5 year difference is associated to working about 12 hours 
less,  and  a  5,000  dollars  more  non-labor  income  to  about  9  hours  less.  For  wives,  the 
corresponding figures are 8 and 50 hours more. While the foreign-born with actual cultural 
differences from the US do not exhibit any significant association with these differences 
(columns 7-10), those immigrant households with a cultural background very similar to the 
US show a significant and larger response to these bargaining power measures: for husbands, 
25 and 12 hours less, and for their wives 26 and 50 hours more. The fact that these couples 
seem more responsive to bargaining power than US-born spouses, may reflect the fact that 
these  type  of  immigrant  couples  react  to  changes  in  the  environment  and  in  outside 
opportunities, as shown by their decision to migrate to another country.  
As reported in columns 7-10, in couples whose ethnicity has a more traditional view on 
gender roles, spouses do not tend to work more or fewer hours according to the balance of 
power measures of age and income differences. This independence of their labor supply may 
strengthen the household-bargaining interpretation of the labor supply responses of the other 
groups of couples, insofar as these two specific factors are present in the household power 
balance, as extensively found in the literature (e.g., Browning, et al., 2011). More traditional 
gender roles attitudes may prevent individuals from taking into account of and responding to 
balance of power  incentives. Only immigrant couples  whose  cultural background is  very 
similar to the US seem to respond to bargaining power forces in the direction predicted and 
found  for  US-born  couples.  It  may  also  be  the  case  that  a  strong  disparity  in  cultural 
background is associated to more rigid labor supplies due to job type or commitment to work 
of these immigrants, so that the power factor measured here would not play any role along 
the labor supply dimension. 
 
15(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-2.16*** 1.035 *** -2.42*** 1.682*** -1.83
(2.66)
*** .01*** *** *** .01*** .0002 .0098***
446614 446614 407181 407181 39433 39433
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-1.36 -2.15 -2.24 -5.04***     5.39*
(1.61) (1.35) (3.16)
.0002 .01 .009*** ** .009***
29449 29449 7003 7003 2981 2981
Table 2. Labor Supply Regressions of Age and Non-Labor Income differences on US-born, and Foreign-born Married Couples, by Culture
All Couples American Couples Foreign Couples
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Age_diff -.796
(.324) (.354) (.284) (.843) (.713)
Y_diff -.0015 -.0017
(.0001) (.0006) (.0001) (.0006) (.0003) (.0005)
Number  of observations
Foreign Couples Foreign Couples  Foreign Couples
with different culture from US with somewhat similar culture to US        with very similar culture to US




(.0006) (.0008) (.0006) (.0009) (.0011) (.001)
Number  of observations
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
16These  findings  point  toward  married  US-native  and  US-similar  couples  valuing  being 
relatively old, controlling for wages and education of each spouse, and for individual age. 
This  evidence  is  consistent  with  what  is  found  in  the  literature,  where  the  spouses‟ age 
difference is considered a traditional measure of bargaining power, and the older spouse has a 
favorable position (e.g. Browning et al., 1994). The same holds in regard of the significance 
of the non-labor income gap, showing that income pooling may not hold for the US-born or 
US-similar couples, in line with the several empirical tests in the literature (e.g., Browining et 
al., 2011K Browning et al., 1994).   
Couples‟  significant  relationship  between  these  forces  and  labor  supply  responses  are 
sizable, corresponding to several days of work a year. The concurrent significance on both 
spouses, and with opposite outcomes, is remarkable given the acknowledged rigidities in the 
labor supplies, and the frequency of the reported labor supply peaking around 40 hours of 
work per week. Traditional analyses do not emphasize changes by both spouses, let alone 
their labor supply responding to bargaining power forces. 
Moreover, no study finds that households‟ labor supply decisions are related to differences 
in non-labor income ownership and age according to their cultural background, suggesting 
that  they  may  reflect  the  collective  household  behavior  of  US-born  couples.  The  intra-
household decision process does not appear to vary by foreign status per se, but it depends on 
the specific culture views on gender roles. These findings also show that income pooling does 
not hold for either US-born or immigrant couples whose culture is very similar to the US. So 
far,  the  income  pooling  hypothesis  and  the  prediction  that  bargaining  power  forces  are 
irrelevant to intra-household decisions had been empirically rejected for several countries and 
time  periods  (Bonke  and  Browning,  2009;  Browning  et  al.,  1994;  Grossbard-Shechtman, 
1993; Grossbard and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2007; Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990). 
Tables  3  and  4  present  the  corresponding  regression  results  with  all  the  estimated 
coefficients.  As  to  the  other  covariates  in  the  labor  supply  equations,  most  parameter 
estimates for all couples are comparable to the literature. In particular, the spouses‟ own wage 
response is negative significant, as is the cross-wage effects between spouses‟ labor supplies. 
The couple‟s total non-labor income and own age have a negative effect on labor supply, 
while education has a positive impact, although the coefficients are not always precisely 
estimated.  Children  living  in  the household  are  associated  with  fewer  hours  of  work  for 
wives, but the opposite holds for husbands, for whom children have a positive effect on labor 
supply. These estimates are in line with the findings in the household labor supply literature, 
reported for instance in Blundell and MaCurdy (1998). 
Overall, the findings presented here are consistent with the spousal ethnical background 
mediating the role of bargaining power in household decisions, also suggesting that spousal 
traits and their differences are not uniformly associated to labor supply across couples within 
the  US.  Their  responsiveness  to  a  common  economic  and  institutional  environment  may 
depend on their ethnicities. From a policy perspective, these comparisons can help to devise 
17 
   (1) (2)    (3) (4)     (5) (6)
-2.16*** 1.035*** -2.42*** 1.682*** -1.83
(2.66)
*** .01*** *** .01*** .0002 .0098 ***
*** *** *** *** .0016*** ***
-107.8*** -91.56*** -106.33 *** -100.58*** -157.39 *** -49.58***
(6.13) (3.13) (5.91) (3.47) (7.67) (6.89)
-8.88 *** -423.99*** 14.72*** -408.19*** -501.38 ***
2.24 (10.86) (2.48) (14.81) (6.62) (15.96)
-2.53*** 1.22*** -3.35*** .405 .71 6.48***
37.39*** -7.53*** 37.46*** -12.48*** 25.22*** 5.12**
(1.69) (2.33)
12.45 16.12*** 9.68*** 15.14*** 11.17*** 14.94***
(1.28) (1.52) (1.53) (1.86)
22.23*** -67.45*** 31.03*** -80.35*** 8.11 -15.55***
(2.09) (2.92) (1.41) (3.49) (5.57) (3.27)
446614 446614 407181 407181 39433 39433
Table 3. Estimation of the Labor Supply Regressions of US-born, and Foreign-born Married Couples
All Couples American Couples Foreign Couples
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Age_diff -.796
(.324) (.354) (.284) (.843) (.713)
Y_diff -.0015 -.0017
(.0001) (.0006) (.0001) (.0006) (.0003) (.0005)
Couple's non-labor income Y -.0013 -.012 -.002 -.012 -.011
(.0001) (.0005) (.0001) (.0006) (.0003) (.0005)
Log of wage of husband
Log of wage of wife -.49
Own Age 
(.32) (.28) (.37) (.27) (.854) (.401)
Education of husband




Number  of observations
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
18    (5) (6)     (7) (8)     (9)     (10)
-1.36 -2.15 -2.24 -5.04***     5.39*
(1.61) (1.35) -3.16
.0002 .01 .009 ** .009***
.0021 *** *** .0011 *** *** .0026 *** .009***
-178.09 *** -38.92 *** -144.94 *** -55.19*** -44.39* -129.98 ***
(9.22) (8.75) (13.70) (15.46) (27.15) (20.56)
*** -507.02 *** 11.59 -537.72*** -51.66 -450.21 ***
(8.61) (17.80) (12.56) (30.18) (34.56) (49.64)
6.65 *** -2.03 4.62*** 10.87*
(1.59) (6.48) (1.87)
24.37 *** 7.37 *** 20.05 *** 46.38 *** -24.14 ***
(1.22) (2.23) (3.49) (3.23) (15.64) (6.86)
12.18 12.23 *** 5.24 15.99*** 27.12 **
(1.54) (2.04) (4.32) (4.69) (15.55) (8.26)
11.01 * -11.49 *** 20.45 * -12.93*** 13.62 -81.82 ***
(5.78) (3.49) (11.60) (7.86) (20.09) (13.84)
29449 29449 7003 7003 2981 2981
Table 4. Estimation of the Labor Supply Regressions of Foreign Born Married Couples by Culture
Foreign Couples Foreign Couples Foreign Couples
with different culture from US with somewhat similar culture to US with very similar culture to US




(.0006) (.0008) (.0006) (.0009) (.0011) (.001)
Couple's non-labor income Y -.013 -.009
(.0005) (.0009) (.0005) (.0009) (.0008) (.002)
Log of wage of husband
Log of wage of wife -.19'
Own Age  -.066 -.379
(.641) (.492) (.849)
Education of husband -.384
Education of wife -.305
Number of children
Number  of observations
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
19public policies targeting immigrant households and their female members in particular, as 
these households may be the ones least likely to respond to family policies or to social and 
institutional factors due to their cultural background “constraining” them to ignore outside 
opportunities and welfare enhancement measures.      
 
4.2 Additional Findings 
Seeminlgy unrelated regressions are presented to fully account for the joint decisions of 
husbands  and  wives,  and  the  potential  correlation  between  their  unobservables.  Table  5 
shows  the  corresponding  estimates,  for  all  types  of  couples.  The  significant  associations 
between age or income differences, and spouses‟ hours of work, reflect the same pattern as in 
the main findings of Table 2, where controls for spouses‟ characteristics were already present 
and the standard errors instead accounted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by state. 
The bargaining power factors are significant for US-born couples and for those foreign 
ones with similar cultural background to the US. Other types of foreign born couples do not 
exhibit  any  association,  not  even  when  the  standard  errors  account  for  the  significant 
correlation at the couple level. Finally, one can see that this correlation appears stronger 
among foreign-born couples than American ones
11. 
Table 6 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the Heckman‟s sample selection 
model  described  in  Section  3.  Its  analysis  and  the  comparison  between  these  Heckman 
selection  estimations  and  the  main  estimations  on  working  couples  presented  in  Table  2 
clearly indicate that controlling or not for sample selection does not affect the associations 
between age and income gaps and couples‟ labor supplies. The significance and the relevance 
of these possible bargaining power factors are not altered in any group of households. Indeed, 
the strength of this entire empirical evidence rests on the fact that, with and without selection, 
the  same  qualitative  results  are  obtained  in  terms  of  significance,  signs,  for  all  types  of 
couples. Quantitatively, the estimates of the coefficients of interest are also similar, as can be 
seen in Table 6.  
                                                 
11 The Breusch-Pagan tests do not reject the correlations, for all types of couples. 
20(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-2.10*** 1.04 *** -2.42*** 1.684*** -1.83**
*** .01*** *** *** .01*** .0002 .0096***
.0522 .0358 .1437
446614 446614 407181 407181 39433 39433
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-1.37 -2.15 -2.25 -5.04***     5.51*
(2.11) (1.83) (3.26)
.0002 .0001 .008*** ** .009***
.1435 .1808 .1273
29449 29449 7003 7003 2981 2981
Table 5. Labor Supply SUR Regressions of Age, Non-Labor Income differences on US- and Foreign-born Married Couples, by Culture
All Couples American Couples Foreign Couples
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Age_diff -.803
(.194) (.185) (.226) (.220) (.734) (.678)
Y_diff -.0016 -.0016
(.0007) (.00008) (.00008) (.00008) (.0003) (.0003)
Correlation error terms
Breusch Pagan Test X2 (P value) 1471.3 (.00) 522.2 (.00) 814.6 (.00)
Number  of observations
Foreign Couples Foreign Couples  Foreign Couples
with different culture from US with somewhat similar culture to US        with very similar culture to US




(.0005) (.0005) (.0007) (.0006) (.0001) (.001)
Correlation error terms
Breusch Pagan Test X2 (P value) 606.4 (.00) 228.8 (.00) 30.5 (.00)
Number  of observations
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) estimated by seemingly unrelated regressions.
Correlation of the error terms of the husbands' and wives' regressions, and the Bresch Pagan test results (X2 and P-value) 
21(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-2.31*** 2.31 *** -2.67*** 1.43*** -2.43*** 1.43
*** .007*** *** *** .007*** .0001 .0059***
*** .073 *** *** .089*** ***
661404 661404 590484 590484 70920 70920
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-2.103 2.02 -2.40 -1.15 -9.36*     9.19*
(1.86) (7.84) (1.69) (1.70) (5.46) (5.03)
.0006 .0059 .0005 .004*** .00007* .0033***
.006 *** .004 .027
55361 55361 11341 11341 4218 4218
Table 6. Estimation of the Labor Supply Regressions of US-born, and Foreign-born Married Couples. Heckman MLE Estimation.
All Couples American Couples Foreign Couples
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Age_diff
(.234) (.298) (.313) (.493) (.538) (.797)
Y_diff -.0012 -.0013
(.0001) (.0004) (.0001) (.0004) (.0003) (.0005)
ρ -.102 -.129 -.110 -.715***
(.006) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.022) (.050)
Number  of observations
Foreign Couples Foreign Couples  Foreign Couples
with different culture from US with somewhat similar culture to US        with very similar culture to US
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
Age_diff
Y_diff
(.0004) (.0078) (.0005) (.0011) (.00005) (.0008)
ρ -.747 -.142' -.558**
(.030) (.049) (.046) (.018) (.209) (.192)
Number  of observations
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman maximum likelihood estimation.
225. Alternative explanations 
It may be possible that the labor supply of the older or richer spouse is not lower as a 
result of the bargaining power forces, but due to poor local economic opportunities and/or 
unfriendly attitudes toward immigrants. Similarly, it could be that older and richer US-born 
individuals  work  less,  and  their  spouses  work  more,  because  they  face  worse  job 
opportunities. There are at least two reasons to believe that the local economy and attitude 
hypothesis does not provide a plausible alternative explanation for the findings illustrated 
above. First, the labor supply regressions include individuals‟ wages and education, own age, 
and state fixed effects (alternatively, state unemployment rate, total and female labor force 
participation rate) which account for the variation in labor market opportunities and attitudes. 
The findings are also robust to adding individual controls for occupation categories. Second, 
the predicted labor supply responses are distinctively opposite on the members of each type 
of couple, and many immigrants with a cultural background different from the US do not 
exhibit any relationship between labor supply and the two bargaining factors. It is difficult to 
understand why the labor supply of an immigrant individual should be lower while his/her 
spouse is higher, when they share the same cultural background, and thus the same labor 
market  conditions  and  potential  earnings  discrimination.  Indeed,  immigrants  from  a  very 
distant culture may be more likely to face discrimination and experience lower labor supplies, 
the opposite pattern to my empirical evidence. As to US-born couples, it is hard to reconcile 
with labor market disparities the opposite outcome of relative age and income on the two 
spouses, when they share the cultural background and more similar age, wage and education 
profiles. 
Moreover, state fixed effects and clustering the standard errors by state or metropolitan 
area capture attitudes and labor market conditions, so that there should be no reason why 
neither the husband nor the wife of the more “traditional” immigrant couples would respond 
to labor market patterns. In particular, the findings show that it is in the couples with a culture 
more  similar  to  the  US  that  one  of  the  spouses  exhibits  lower  hours  of  work,  which  is 
inconsistent  with  a  discriminatory  explanation  against  immigrants  with  ethnicities  very 
different from the US. Finally, as emphasized by Carroll et al. (1994) and Fernandez (2007), 
immigrants are unlikely to be a representative sample of their home country‟s population and 
they may experience various shocks making them deviate from their traditional behavior. 
However, all these issues would create a bias toward finding culture to be insignificant, and 
toward immigrants to be more likely to behave as US-born individuals.  
Controlling for own age and wage, the age difference between spouses should not capture 
an individual‟s marginal utility of leisure and affect his/her labor supply through this channel. 
Matching  preferences  either  do  not  provide  a  plausible  alternative  explanation  for  my 
findings. Older individuals may prefer to marry younger persons, but this youth value does 
not translate into a higher preference for leisure. Matching with younger individuals does not 
necessarily affect the marginal utility from leisure, making the older spouse work less.  
23The same reasoning holds for non-labor income differences. In particular, if non-labor 
income is endogenous to labor supply choices, then it is likely that high non-labor income 
suggests high labor supply. If an individual‟s disutility from work is low, he/she works many 
hours and as a result owns a high non-labor income. However, this endogeneity bias cannot 
explain the findings presented in this study since it would predict more hours of work with 
higher income, whereas these bargaining power forces predict that higher non-labor income 
differences are  associated  with lower  labor  supply,  and the more “traditional” immigrant 
couples do not exhibit any labor supply relationship at all. Finally, non-labor income has been 
treated as an exogenous measure of bargaining power by the literature (Browning et al, 1994; 
Thomas, 1990)
12.  
It may be argued that bargaining power variables such as income and age difference may 
somewhat  capture  differential  productivity  in  household  production.  Those  foreign-born 
couples distant from the US culture may not respond to these factors because their labor 
supply choices follow a family human capital investment, in which wives work more hours 
and in worse jobs to allow for the husband to make the main human capital investment 
(Chiswick  and  Houseworth,  2010).  Their  labor  supplies  would  correspond  to  stronger 
household  specialization  and  therefore  be  much  less  responsive  to  any  bargaining  power 
force. However, controlling for own age, and education and wages of both spouses, should 
ensure that comparative advantage and household productivity is properly controlled for and 
disentangled from other factors. Besides, there is no specific economic reason why the older 
spouse should specialize in household production and work less, while the younger partner 
works more in the labor market regardless of the gender of the older. A similar argument 
holds for non-labor income ownership. Being relatively richer does not imply being more 
productive at home and working less in the labor market. Finally, the literature emphasizes 
that this family investment model argument for immigrant families may not be so relevant in 
explaining their labor supply behavior (Blau et al., 2003). 
 
6. Conclusions 
The labor supply choices of married men and women are empirically analyzed according 
to their cultural background and balance of power, using US 2000 Census data on native and 
foreign-born  individuals.  Specifically,  I  test  whether  and  how  different  spousal  ethnic 
backgrounds mediate the role of bargaining power in household decisions.  
The labor supplies of US-born  spouses, and of those foreign-born with similar cultures to 
the US, are found to be significantly associated with  two common bargaining power forces, 
the  age  and  non-labor  income  differences  between  spouses,  while  the  labor  supplies  of 
                                                 
12 The cross-sectional nature of the Census decennial data and their lack of any individual wealth variable do not provide 
instruments for individual non-labor income and the non-labor income bargaining factor. 
 
24couples  where  spouses  belong  to  ethnicities  supporting  a  traditional  gender  role  and 
institutions are not. The significant negative relationship between hours worked and being the 
relatively older and/or richer spouse holds only for US-born couples and for those foreign-
born households coming from countries with similar family institutions to the US, controlling 
for both spouses‟ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Interestingly, households 
whose culture of origin is quite different from the US, with traditional views on gender roles, 
do not exhibit any association between these age and income gaps and their labor supply 
decisions.  These  culture-asymmetric  estimates  suggest  that  spousal  traits  and  outside 
opportunities  are  assessed  differently  across  couples  within  the  US,  and  that  their 
responsiveness  to  a  common  economic  and  institutional  environment  depends  on  their 
ethnicities. 
This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between cultural background, 
bargaining power, and household labor supply, suggesting a link between ethnicity and the 
role of bargaining power forces in labor supply decisions, within a country and a common 
institutional  framework.  Accounting  for  cultural  background  may  be  significant  in  the 
analysis of household decision-making, to capture the mechanism through which individuals 
relate to and make use of their outside opportunities within the couple. Moreover, the degree 
of effectiveness of a public policy targeting families, or of social and institutional factors 
indirectly related to households, may depend upon households‟ perceptions and incentives to 
respond  to  these  policies.  In  this  perspective,  my  contribution  is  complementary  to  the 
existing literature on household behavior (e.g., Browning et al., 2011), and also to the studies 
on  labor  supply  effects  of  culture  (e.g.,  Fernandez  and  Fogli,  2006;  Furtado  and 
Theodoropoulos, 2011). 
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